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Humanism, Education and Spirituality: Approaching Psychosis with Levinas 
Glenn Morrison 
Forthcoming, Australian EJournal of Theology (Feb 2008) 
ABSTRACT: The article investigates the recent turn towards Emmanuel Levinas’ writings in 
the philosophy of Education.  Engaging this turn, the article sets out to develop an ethical, 
personal and contemplative approach towards understanding and responding to psychosis. By 
imagining a Levinasian horizon for understanding the experience of psychosis in the 
Teaching-Learning environment, Levinas’ thought gives hope to take on the work of justice 
and offer a gift of friendship especially when faced with students experiencing psychosis. The 
approach towards people suffering the moods and difficulties of psychosis, the article argues, 
parallels the very spiritual practice of contemplation. 
 
INTRODUCTION TO HUMANISM 
The education of the human person is essential for wholeness and well-being. Our quest for 
meaning and truth can follow a crooked path, but we might find some direction by aligning 
our education practice towards a horizon of goodness and spirituality.  It is my argument that 
Levinas’ ethical metaphysics and Christian spirituality can together produce a significant 
rupture and radical turnabout in the development of humanism’s impact upon Education 
philosophy and practice. A contemplative and ethical stance reaching to the foundations of 
teaching and learning might give rise to a hospitable, generous, engaging and responsible 
environment. Yet, spirituality and ethics always asks more.  We are called, ordered and, 
perhaps, even ordained, to invite that stranger in our midst.  Accordingly, towards such an 
almost messianic ethical and spiritual horizon, there lies hope to envision a transforming 
readiness for Education to reflect on its approach towards mental illness.  After all, just as, 
“The Lord is near to the brokenhearted, and saves the crushed in spirit” (Psalm 34:18), so too, 
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we might find ourselves called and chosen (Matt 22:14) to have a sense of “What no eye has 
seen, nor ear heard …” (1 Cor 2:9; cf. Isa. 64:4), namely, a word of love, justice and 
friendship with those we might fear and forget.   
 
One of the key theories of learning in the philosophy of Education, humanism takes a turn 
towards subjectivity, human freedom, ethics and self-discovery. Distinguishing itself by an 
ethical and metaphysical approach to learning,1 it provides a context for the ideas and ideals 
of personhood and relations with others to mature in the foundations of teaching and learning.   
Humanism has been associated with ancient Greek thought (“the Sophists and Socrates”), 
Jewish and Christian theology (the attempt through the ages to unify faith and reason), the 
Renaissance (the ability of the human person), the Enlightenment (the scientific appeal to 
reason alone), Marxism (overcoming exploitation and self-alienation), Phenomenology and 
Existentialism (emphasising various modes of existence, consciousness and freedom of the 
human person), Pragmatism (the practical application of philosophy to the real world) and 
Psychology.  Since 1970, the psychological turn has had a major impact on Education. 
Theories such as Maslow’s hierarchy of human needs, Carl Roger’s “client-centred therapy” 
and Knowles’ theory of andragogy have all had a major role for influencing adult learning.  
However, in recent times since the late twentieth century, there have been signs of a new 
phase of humanism, namely a second Enlightenment, in which ideas of otherness and even 
spirituality can play a useful part in the development of the philosophy of Education.2 
 
The second Enlightenment, in our very complex time of postmodernity, has particularly set 
out not only to bring faith and reason together, but to stretch faith and reason towards a place 
and a time for what may seem impossible to emerge.  This new age of dialogue between faith 
and reason has had important consequences for enhancing both continental thought and 
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theology.  But this new movement, in its birth pangs today, is beginning to make an 
important influence upon Education.  This is illustrated today by a growing number of 
Education scholars taking an interest in the continental thought and ethical metaphysics of 
Emmanuel Levinas. Sharon Todd is perhaps the most well known.3 Another scholar, 
Michalinos Zembylas, has brought out a rather interesting context (as it exemplifies not only 
the Second Enlightenment’s turn towards otherness, but also its turn toward spirituality and 
theology4) in which Levinas’ thought and Christian spirituality might contribute to the 
philosophy of Education.5 For the purposes of this article, I will engage the contributions of 
these two authors. Other major contributors include Kimberley Abunuwara, Gert Biesta, Ann 
Chinnery, Carl Anders Säftröm, Roger Simon and Aparna Mishra Tarc.6 Before looking into 
Todd’s and Zembylas’ contributions, let us take some moments to engage one significant, 




Levinas provides an autobiographical ‘signature’ in his last chapter of his work, Difficult 
Freedom.7 He begins with a ‘disparate inventory’ of autobiographical facts mostly relating to 
his education and teaching career.  Following this he provides a lone and terrible lament: “It 
[his life] is dominated by the presentiment and memory of the Nazi Horror”.8 Beginning with 
the shock and tragedy of his former teacher, Martin Heidegger, embracing Nazism in 1933 
and lasting until the end of captivity in a stalag in Germany in 1945, Levinas’ thought began 
to resist the temptation to find meaning and truth by way of the categories of Being, presence 
and objectivity.   
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Going beyond the ontological phenomenology of Martin Heidegger through developing a 
unique vocabulary of highly complex terms and ideas, Levinas set out to think of Being 
“otherwise”,9 that is to find a sense of transcendence in Being in terms of justice, mercy, 
peace and the ethics of prayer. This suggests that beyond the egoistical life of Being, that is, 
being-for-oneself and for-one’s-own-possibilities, is the very life of responsibility for the 
Other.  However, such responsibility is infinite and exemplified by demanding states of 
expiation, humiliation and taking responsibility for the one who persecutes you.  Indeed, 
Levinas’ whole thought is a “difficult freedom” and a very liturgy of responsibility 
witnessing to and being commanded by the word of God in the face of the Other.10 We can 
begin to appreciate that using Levinas’ thought might very well signify impossibility. 
However, as we shall see now, his thought gives rise to finding a way to articulate a moral 
conscience, a sense of justice and locus for unknowability in Education.  These new 
perspectives challenge and stretch the foundations of good teaching and learning practice. 
 
TWO LEVINASIAN SCHOLARS IN EDUCATION: TODD AND ZEMBYLAS 
Among the growing number of scholars beginning to utilise Levinas’ philosophy for 
Education, Sharon Todd has, according to Katz,11 been the first to publish a monograph on 
Levinas and Education, entitled, Learning from the Other: Levinas, Psychoanalysis, and 
Ethical Possibilities in Education.  Katz comments that Todd’s work seeks to connect 
Education with social justice, non-violence and moral development; as a result the major 
roles of the teacher are listening and attuning to the other.12  In contrast, in an earlier writing, 
“Guilt, Suffering and Responsibility”,13 Todd investigates the pedagogical and ethical 
significance of students’ experience of guilt.  Let us begin our analysis of Todd’s contribution 
with this article as it gives an existential and programmatic starting point to connect her 
applications of reading Levinas with her other writings.  In “Guilt, Suffering and 
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Responsibility”, Todd sets out to provide three phenomenological moments of guilt from 
Levinas’ thought.   
 
First, according to Todd, guilt is “… an inadequation of the self in responsibility”.14 From the 
very beginning of the relation with the other, the self is guilty as it faces an overwhelming 
demand of responsibility. Second, guilt is a belated response signifying that the other’s cry 
and suffering is beyond the everyday experience of our senses.  As a result the face of the 
Other absolutely surprises the self in its guilty situation of being late and doing too little for 
the Other.  Todd relates the third phenomenal moment of guilt as “… the redoubling of 
suffering through the persecutory call of the other”.15  This suggests that the relation to the 
Other’s suffering necessary entails a persecution for we are accused by the Other and even by 
our own conscience as it calls us into question.  Consequently, the encounter with the Other 
pursues us towards the horizon of even encountering the Other’s fear of death and loneliness, 
and further, ordering us to make a response. 
 
We can appreciate that Todd’s Levinasian reading of guilt necessitates a traumatic experience 
and begs the question of whether considering guilt in education actually has value.16  For 
Todd, the value lies in “… introducing stories of suffering into our classroom … to allow 
students opportunities for articulating their own complex responses (which can cut across a 
range of emotions, such an empathy and outrage as well as guilt).17 We can see that her 
article is quite programmatic in the use of Levinas. She identifies the importance of guilt and 
the necessary suffering (in another words, compassion) in its connection with “listening to the 
other”.18 We find here a means towards the fulfilment of good and challenging education 
practice, namely an ethic of listening.  Here, Todd provides an interesting connection with an 
“ambiguous” reading of eros. 
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For Todd, “… the capacity to listen to the other and be moved by the other”19 beyond our 
tendencies to reduce him or her to an object of knowledge and experience signifies a response 
to eros.  Giving a reading of Levinas’ ambiguous stance towards eros, Todd seems to capture 
Levinas’ erotic laden language of ethical transcendence to reposition eros in education as an 
ethic of responsibility.  Imagining the ethical possibility for eros, Todd allows its very 
ambiguity to communicate “love, generosity and affection” as “further openness and 
communication”.20  This provides a maternal context and a maternal ethic in education.  A 
response to eros might very well give “birth to signification”: to the opportunity for teachers 
to reflect more deeply on their relational and embodied responsibility to students.21  
 
Although Todd does not indicate, her reflection on giving an ethical foundation to eros seems 
to parallel Levinas’ Talmudic conception of mercy and the maternity of God: “Rakhamim 
[the Hebrew term for Mercy] is the relation of the uterus to the other, whose gestation takes 
place within it. Rakhamim is maternity itself.  God as merciful is God defined by 
maternity.”22 Further, Levinas illuminates: “For the encounter with the face I still reserve 
another word: miséricorde, mercy, when one assumes responsibility for the suffering of the 
other.  This appears naturally as the phenomenon of love.”23  The encounter with the Other 
speaks of a maternal condition of mercy.  Far from the experience of erotic joy, such all-
exacting alterity and love is difficult and painful.  Perhaps this helps to explain why Todd 
provides a grave recasting of eros to give birth to a “profound sensitivity”24 in education.  In 
practical terms, this can be exemplified by Todd’s view that when students struggle for 
meaning in regards to the educator’s demand that they form a relationship to the curriculum, 
the teachers are called to bear forth “a non-violent element in the teaching-learning 
relationship”.25  Developing such a profound sensitivity to be mindful of students’ trauma and 
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embarrassment (which Todd relates as “the trauma of wetting oneself in front of the class”) 
signifies a hope that teachers can recognise the ethical significance of their role.26  This seems 
to suggest that teachers, for example, could recognise the value of “making contact” with the 
students’ emotions such as “being touched”. Rather than creating hurt, the teacher can 
surprise the student with acts of goodness and encouragement that are touching (contactus) 
and, hence, make contact with the student’s mind, heart and soul.27  With this in mind, let us 
turn now to the contribution of Michalinos Zembylas. 
 
Michalinos Zembylas sets out to ground the idea of unknowability in education philosophy. 
By appealing to the philosophy of Emmanuel Levinas in dialogue with the Christian 
theological and spiritual tradition of via negativa, he explains: 
 
Both Levinas’s philsophy and via negativa attempt to assert what cannot be asserted, what 
is impossible to know. In via negativa, God cannot be “expressed” in any meaningful 
sense, because human intellect is finite; this ineffability is also a Levinasian understanding 
of the Other as an unknowable alterity … Of course in via negativa, the totally Other, that 
which is sublime beyond representation, is God.  In this sense, it may be said that Levinas 
embraces a kind of via negativa towards the ethics of otherness; i.e. knowing the Other is 
impossible. … Both via negativa (especially St. John28) and Levinas emphasize the 
importance of the “passive” reception of God and the Other.29 
 
Bringing both Levinas’ thought and the Christian tradition of via negativa together in 
conversation, suggests that behind Zembylas’ intention to ground a sense of unknowability in 
education, is the very desire to provide an entry for spiritual practice in the conversation.  In 
Education terms, this signifies a “transformation” of the goals of educators to create a space 
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and time (a readiness) “for embracing unknowing”.30  Going beyond the ontological 
thematisations of via negativa and hence its fall into the objective generalisations of the 
individual, Zembylas finds Levinas’ notion of infinity in the relation of responsibility for the 
Other, an opportunity to develop “a pedagogy of unknowing”.31 He names his approach as 
witnessing (in contrast to either becoming a mere spectator or a cold critical inquirer) in the 
teaching-learning environment.  Exhorting a teaching practice as a “witness” in which the 
ethical relation with the student Other is primary, Zembylas uses three Levinasian themes, 
namely, vigilance, humility and silence. Whilst associating theses themes with the tradition of 
via negativa to deepen their spiritual significance for Education, we begin to see an ethical, 
spiritual practice taking form. 
 
The attitude of vigilance towards the Other is not only a patient waiting of being exposed to 
the Other’s unknowability, but it signifies a stance of humility or an ideal of holiness in 
which the self becomes “an Other” or in more manageable terms, the humble self gives truth 
a voice.  Such a voice might also be articulated (but not always) by way of silence.  As a 
result, we might hear transcendence (deeper, non-intentional or passive communication) in 
the depths of the Other’s silence.32  Admittedly, whilst I have tried to extend and clarify 
Zembylas’ analysis here of the Levinasian ideas and themes of vigilance, humility and 
silence, we can note that a spiritual disposition towards teaching and learning is beginning to 
take shape. 
 
Towards developing an ethical and spiritual “praxis of unknowing”,33 Zembylas envisions a 
world of education in which the roles of teacher and student are reversed. Taking up a radical 
position, he argues that educators need to abandon their epistemological teaching base as 
“knowers”.34  Zembylas sets a task for teachers, namely, to think otherwise than being a 
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knower as a means to develop a radically new orientation of teaching.  Beyond the egoistic 
interest of knowledge and its temptation to totalise the other as a function of knowledge (for 
example stereotyping learners as surface or deep; or using such terms as “efficiency,”  
“standards” and “quality control”), lies a “praxis of unknowing”. 35   
 
Touching on the Levinasian ideas of sensitivity, the face and infinity, Zembylas offers an 
explanation of a praxis of unknowing: “Enacting unknowing in teaching and learning initiates 
relatedness, attentiveness, and generosity. Claiming a place for unknowing in educational 
settings offers hope in opening up to the Other.  This kind of teaching and learning can 
happen only when knowledge is not the ultimate goal of education”.36 Zembylas begins to 
initiate a possibility for giving a context and a voice for Levinas’ pure ethical thought.  
Accordingly, for example, once a feeling of “infinity” can be nurtured within the classroom, a 
possibility exists for students to cultivate “attitudes of ‘seeking, desiring and questioning’”.37  
Does this suggest that Zembylas priorities nurturing feeling, emotions and attitudes rather 
than knowledge in the teaching and learning environment? No doubt, such experiences and 
behaviours are essential for the conduct of good communication.   
 
Developing such a “sense and sensibility” beyond the totality of knowledge reminds us that 
our infinite quest and search is not just for meaning and truth, but also for seeking the good.  
This suggests that a certain ethical and faith-ful respect must exist towards the student.  Given 
that there is a whole world of unknowability in the relation with the student, the teacher is 
compelled to embrace otherness, which for Zembylas represents “… a curious element of 
redemption; in the lack of knowledge, the meaning of its absence is found”.38  Equally, not 
only is an ethical respect demanded, but one that overflows towards developing a spiritual 
practice of safeguarding “the gift of unknowing”39 in the relation with the student. 
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EDUCATION AND PSYCHOSIS 
Both Todd and Zembylas have found Levinas’ complex philosophy to be of grave import for 
developing a humanistic philosophy of Education. Together they emphasise existential and 
phenomenological states and stances to negotiate a strategy for good education practice in 
teaching and learning.  Todd’s stress on listening to the Other and Zembylas’ articulation of 
unknowability provide a basis for understanding the importance of communication by way of 
Levinasian reflections on guilt, eros (love, generosity, affection), vigilance, humility, silence 
and sensitivity.  Looked at together, their reflections evoke a generous and engaging 
responsibility taking the form of hospitality and even the love of friendship. 
 
We are now approaching a context in which the discussion of the philosophy of Emmanuel 
Levinas and Education can be taken a step further towards the horizon of people living with 
the moods and difficulties of psychosis.  Sharon Todd herself is not averse to bringing 
psychoanalysis to bear on Education, as the title of her book indicates: Learning from the 
Other: Levinas, Psycholanalysis, and Ethical Possibilities in Education.  However, whilst 
Todd is concerned with combining Levinas’ ethical metaphysics with psychoanalysis to 
develop “an effective pedagogical theme for social justice”,40 my contention is that Levinas’ 
ethical ideas can provide a vision for encountering people with psychosis in a teaching and 
learning environment.  Towards such an aim, the Levinasian idea of “having a sense” (in its 
expression as love, justice and peace41), nurtures a very possibility to engage generously and 
responsibly with people experiencing the delusions and illusions of psychosis. In Levinasian 
terms, this signifies a stance of “otherwise than Being”, that is to say, taking on the work of 
justice and peace through an agapic love for others. 
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The experience of psychosis is like a dark and consuming horror; the self looses its feeling of 
selfhood as the delusion brings about an altered, enthralling and terrifying state of existence.  
As a result, the person strives to confuse itself with the good and deny the possibility of death 
as a means to maintain its experience of terrifying and enthralling transcendence.42 By the 
very possibility of “having a sense”, an intention of love that has the quality of 
mystery/unknowability or “that which cannot be known or represented totally in 
consciousness”, we allow for the teacher a vision to encounter the student with psychosis.  
Such a vision would not find rest in any stereotypical characterisation, but through desire of 
profound proximity.  This suggests a hospitality of justice and a gift of friendship, in which 
the lost self of the student with psychosis might for a moment reveal it broken heart and 
shattered spirit (Psalm 34:18). 
 
Bringing together Levinas’ philosophy and Education can provide many opportunities to 
reflect on a multitude of contexts.  Mental health will always be a prevailing challenge.  It is 
my belief that with Levinas, we might find an ethical vision to develop a sense of relating 
with those with psychosis in the classroom, and thus a hope that, “At the very moment where 
all is lost all seems possible”.43 Perhaps this is the time to do the impossible.  After all, our 
age of postmodernity testifies to a Second Enlightenment that at once challenges, confuses 
and gives hope to our very sense of being human and being responsible for others.  
Accordingly, let us begin by engaging Levinas’ idea of “having a sense” within a practical 






HAVING A SENSE AND APPROACHING PSYCHOSIS IN TEACHING AND 
LEARNING 
Levinas seeks to overcome the difficulty of describing experience that defies objectivity and 
thematic consciousness by elaborating the notion of “having a sense”.44  Here he refers to the 
example of love.  This has some similarities to a broader philosophical and theological 
tradition on “affective” or “connatural knowledge”, which give primacy to love over 
conceptual or rational cognition.45  He does not, of course, rely on the metaphysical or 
psychological framework that this tradition assumes.  He writes: 
 
But “to have a sense” does not mean the same as “to represent.”  The act of love has a 
sense, but this does not mean that it includes a representation of the object loved together 
with a purely subjective feeling which has no sense and which accompanies the 
representation.  The characteristic of the loved object is precisely to be given in a love 
intention, an intention which is irreducible to a purely theoretical representation.46 
 
This passage, coming from Levinas’ earliest writings, is remarkable, not only for his 
understanding of the affectivity involved in our knowledge of the Other, but also in its 
notable similarity to those strands of sapiential or mystical affectivity that are found in the 
scholastic tradition and in its current developments.  For Levinas, however, this affectivity 
enters precisely into his descriptions of ethical consciousness, as it relates to the Other 
beyond any abstract form of representation.  Experiences such as love cannot be contained, as 
it were, in egoistic or inner subjective consciousness. In love, consciousness transcends itself 
beyond the range of intellectual, moral or culturally conditioned objectification.  In short, by 
distinguishing representation from “having a sense”, Levinas indicates his concrete ethical 
concern to transcend purely theoretical analysis.  But, none the less, Levinas’ analysis 
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remains a pure ethics of otherness that needs other contexts for expression.  Accordingly, 
having a sense necessitates a non-intentionality, or in Husserlian terms, a noesis (the act of 
consciousness itself, the cogitatio) without a noema (the objectifying act, the cogitatum). 
 
In Teaching and Learning, a rupture between consciousness and the objectifying act might 
occur in the very moment of encounter between the teacher and the student experiencing the 
difficulty and stress of psychosis.  Just as the experience of love makes a rupture between 
lovers so that their consciousness overflows with what cannot be contained (namely the 
mystery and beauty of the other), so the face-to-face experience of teacher and student may 
for an instance cause a rupture and trauma of responsibility as well as desire for hospitality. 
Behind our masks and roles, a face communicates fear and loneliness.  Like the face of love, 
the face of the one with psychosis signifies a piercing, wounding and commanding word to 
journey into the person’s life and offer welcome, generosity and hospitality.  The hidden 
wounds on the Other’s face commands attention and responsibility.   Let us now envisage 
how Levinas’ intriguing analysis of “having a sense” might take us further in our own 
reflection. 
 
In a later development, Levinas will move more consistently beyond both Husserlian 
phenomenology and Heideggerian fundamental ontology into the realm of alterity.  His 
“having a sense” is set in contrast to any presumption of apprehending Being.  The following 
dense passage illustrates this point: 
 
But the face, wholly open, can at the same time be in itself because it is in the trace of 
illeity.  Illeity is the origin of the alterity of being in which the in itself of objectivity 
participates while also betraying it. 
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The God who passed is not the model of which the face would be an image.  To be in the 
image of God does not mean to be an icon of God but to find oneself in his trace.  The 
revealed God of our Judeo-Christian spirituality maintains all the infinity of his absence, 
which is the personal “order” itself.  He shows himself only by his trace, as is said in 
Exodus 33.  To go toward Him is not to follow this trace, which is not a sign; it is through 
this illeity, situated beyond the calculations and reciprocities of economy and of the world, 
that being has a sense.  A sense which is not a finality.47 
 
These words illustrate, first of all, Levinas’ post-phenomenological inversion of Husserl’s 
thought. Consciousness of “something” is inverted into an absolute passivity in the face of 
the Other.  Second, it illustrates his departure from Heidegger.  The subject is not defined by 
care for itself, and its finite thinking no longer simply refers to the infinite.  For Levinas’ 
ethical emphasis, the Other’s approach inverts the ego.  The finitude of being for-oneself is 
turned inside out toward the infinity of being for-the-other.  Giving an enigmatic articulation 
of such infinity, Levinas brings to attention the connection between alterity and illeity. 
 
Levinas describes alterity as the trace of illeity.  The word illeity is a neologism derived from 
the French third person singular (il) and Latin (ille), meaning “that one”.  Levinas describes it 
as, “… the he [or “that one”] in the depth of the you”.48  This is one of Levinas’ more 
complex and, indeed, complicated, notions because of its large and shifting range of 
connotations.  The referential scope of illeity extends on occasion to God, the Infinite or “the 
third” (le Tiers) or even to what might be confused with the stirrings of the there is [il y a].49   
Eschewing precise definitions, Levinas is not always consistent, occupied as he is, for the 
most part, with the dyad of the self and the Other.  His elaboration of the interrelationship 
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within the triad of the self, the Other and illeity receives less attention, which does not make 
for any simple clarification in this area. 
 
As Levinas’ thought progresses, his exposition becomes more idiosyncratic and exponentially 
more difficult to unravel.  His idea of illeity might be best interpreted by comparing it with 
the unnameable Tetragrammaton (YHWH, הוהי).  Just as the Hebrew words, Adonai (the 
Lord) or Ha Shem (the Name), are used in the reading of the Tetragrammaton, so what is 
“otherwise” to our experience (the face of God, Exodus 33:23) in which the Infinite passes 
transcribes the very signification of otherness.50  Just as the Tetragrammaton is 
unpronounceable, so the illeity in the face of the Other is non-phenomenal; both remain an 
enigma that can never be re-presented by thought and thematised as an object.51 
 
In the environment of approaching the student, Levinas’ idea of illeity suggests that for the 
most part, the student’s face remains a non-phenomenal phenomenon.  In other words, the 
face of the student cannot be effectively reduced to our interpretations and judgments.  The 
idea of illeity signifies a radical disposition of approaching the student with psychosis in a 
fashion “otherwise” than our usual experience.  Akin to the openness required in spiritual 
experience (such as in the transcendence of contemplation), we might find a new sight and a 
new hearing of the Other.  For example, when we allow the very reality of the psychosis to 
by-pass our senses, emotions and judgment, we can enter into a space and time (a readiness) 
to approach first the existence of the student, namely, for example, whether the student is 
enthusiastic, curious, open, friendly, upset, angry, aggressive or despondent.  Hence, when 
we provide a stance in which allows for the absence of pre-judged feelings and 
objectifications of students with psychosis, we might be able to provide a richer and more 
perceptive approach.  For example, if a student approaches us with delusional and disruptive 
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behaviour, a first step might best be provided to aim not at the reality (objectifying act) of the 
delusions (such as found in their reasoning and explanations), but to give priority to the very 
act of consciousness itself.  This means attending to what lies hidden in the depths of the 
heart and mind such as issues of acceptance, loneliness and fear of death. 
 
Rather than emphasising a psychoanalytical stance, I want to suggest a radical ethical stance 
of approaching the student with psychosis through developing a sense of “unknowing” or 
going beyond the temptation to follow our objectifying tendency of reducing the Other to 
interpretation and knowledge.  This may well help to prevent prejudice and fear of the Other.  
But, more importantly, it may provide a deeper insight into the very dark, painful and 
terrifying world of psychosis.  Therefore, for example, when we give the possibility of 
transcending our senses and feelings of seeing and hearing the psychosis, we allow for 
another sense to emerge, namely the possibility for compassion and heartfelt understanding.  
“Having a heart” to temper one’s approach may just be enough to go a little further to 
develop responsible tactics and strategies as a means to approach the student experiencing the 
dark moods of psychosis.  We might, then, begin to approach the denuding trace of psychosis 
in the face. 
 
Consequently, we can begin to appreciate Levinas’ connection of the face with the trace of 
illeity.  He also connects the idea of “in itself”: “Illeity is the origin of the alterity of being in 
which the in itself of objectivity participates while also betraying it”.52 The face can be in 
itself, in a fragile objectivity, because of the trace of illeity.  However, the in itself of 
objectivity betrays alterity by arresting the movement of openness to the Other, due to the 
tendency to abstract and thematise.   There is a recurrent tension within the self between 
ethical and self-referential behaviour.  In the teaching and learning setting, this helps to 
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emphasise the reality of the psychosis sets out to prevent ethical responses; it produces “a 
fragile objectivity”, a strangeness and absurdity that shocks and surprises to the point of 
leaving us numb to respond.  Hence, we face a certain ambiguity in the face of the Other as it 
both communicates a confusion between commanding us to respond and to not respond.  
However, for the most part, looking at Levinas’ development of the idea of “in itself”, there 
is a sense that beyond the possible confusion with the fragility and darkness of the “in itself” 
(the il y a or “there is”), there lies the realm of the good. 
 
Later, in Otherwise than Being, Levinas develops the idea of in itself by employing the 
German terms, an sich and in sich, in reference to the self-recurrent character of the self, in 
its authentic desire to remain on the hither side of the moral responsibility which exceeds all 
calculation.53  For Levinas, the in itself of the self can be fully realised only in the life of 
disinterestedness.  Levinas allows that, “… the face, wholly open, can at the same time be in 
itself because it is in the trace of illeity”.54   This is a helpful clarification in that the trace 
helps to clarify that the trace of illeity in the Other’s face disturbs the self’s consciousness to 
the point where the self becomes aware of that truth that it is more fully itself when it is for-
the-other.  This is a more ethical and metaphysical view of the in itself. It may well provide a 
challenging guide for the teacher towards an approach of disinterestedness or responsibility 
for the student evidencing psychosis.  The student’s behaviour, by disturbing our conscience, 
might provoke a sense of otherness.  This confirms that the teacher’s possible encounter with 
the depths of his or her own consciousness and conscience is just as eventful as the student’s 
experience of psychosis. 
 
Levinas’ later writings55 confirm that the trace of illeity is both unrepresentable and non-
thematisable.  In terms of the longer passage cited above, I would suggest that through the 
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idea of illeity Levinas seeks to resolve the impossibility of Being “having a sense”.  For the 
trace of illeity awakens a sense of compassion and goodness in Being, but without permitting 
such compassion and goodness to be reduced to an objectification or any representable image 
such as empathy (the experience or knowledge of another’s experience).  Levinas states later 
in Otherwise than Being that the trace of illeity is not a sign.  He means rather that, the self 
itself becomes a sign, testifying to having been provoked into responsibility by illeity.56  We 
may then ask whether teachers are called and even ordered to be signs and opportunities for 
the student to find goodness, generosity, hospitality and justice. 
 
According to Levinas, illeity is “situated beyond the calculations and reciprocities of 
economy and of the world”. 57  This indicates a non-phenomenal link between the ethical self, 
the Other and illeity: the ethical self signals responsibility for the Other without disclosing 
and proving anything about the trace of illeity.  The self can do this because it has a sense in 
Being which implies no finality.  The non-finality is necessary because the trace of illeity has 
imposed on the self a life of bearing testimony, but in a way that is absolutely detached from 
comprehending the meaning and invoking – or controlling – it as an ongoing, conscious 
presence.58  What is implied here is the indirect way (beyond essence) of the manner in which 
having a sense of goodness directs the teacher, for example, to be responsible, and to be a 
sign of alliance with the student affected by psychosis.  
 
In the resulting disinterestedness the synchrony of Being and peace takes form.59   As 
consciousness goes towards something other, there occurs a proximity with “the third” – in a 
pacific relationship of justice with others.  The following passage condenses these themes: 
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… it is on the basis of proximity that being takes on its just meaning.  In the indirect ways 
of illeity, in the anarchical provocation which ordains me to the other, is imposed the way 
which leads to thematisation and becoming conscious.  Becoming conscious is motivated 
by the presence of the third alongside the neighbour approached.  The third is also 
approached; and the relationship between the neighbour and the third cannot be indifferent 
to me when I approach.  There must be justice among incomparable ones. … In this 
disinterestedness – when, as a responsibility for the other, it is also a responsibility for the 
third – the justice that compares, assembles, and conceives, the synchrony of being and 
peace, takes form.60 
 
To summarise: so far, I have shown how Levinas’ having a sense (non-thematisable 
consciousness) is related to being in Being through the trace of illeity.  I have further argued 
that having a sense in Being means that the self becomes an unthematisable sign of goodness 
and compassion. For the self cannot reduce the Other to a presence in consciousness because 
it exceeds all thought and language.  There is, however, a way for Being to take on a just 
meaning, without implying that alterity is a function of Being.  It is only through the indirect 
ways of illeity that Being must be understood.  In other words, although the “otherwise than 
Being” (alterity) is outside the ontological order, it is understood, nonetheless, as in Being.61  
The ideas of “in Being” and “beyond Being” are not separable, even if ambiguity is an 
inevitable outcome.  If justice is to come to expression, some thematisation and intentional 
form of consciousness are required. Accordingly, we are now in a position to suggest that 
once an ethical, compassionate stance towards the existence of the student with psychosis is 
maintained, we can appropriately begin to make critical judgments and engage in a genuine 




We can offer some possible further clarification.  In Otherwise than Being, Levinas states that 
proximity, the very refusal of presence, converts “into my presence as present, that is, as a 
hostage delivered over as a gift to the other”.62  This would seem to suggest that the gift has 
to be betrayed by presence in order to be given.  However, despite the betrayal or the 
inevitability of thematisation and consciousness, the gift contains within it the trace of the 
passing of illeity.  But there is a further complication.  What delivers the gift over to presence 
and thematisation is the interruption of “the third party” or “the absent Other” (who is also a 
neighbour of the Other).63   
 
There are three aspects of “the third” as Levinas understands it. First, “the third” is concretely 
manifested in suffering and the cry for justice.64 Second, “the third” imposes limits upon the 
extent to which self is responsible.  Although responsibility is never mitigated, the self cannot 
ever fulfil its responsibilities. Lastly, “the third” is the very fact of consciousness for it 
demands that the self measure and know its cry for justice.65  As a result, “the third” gives 
rise to a dialectical relationship between justice and totality, even if the totality must be 
finally transcended.66 
 
Engaging the context of approaching psychosis in teaching and learning, we may transpose 
Levinas’ idea of “the third” to the absent Other (other Others), namely the family and friends 
of the student, the peers and other teachers, and health providers such as counsellors, mental 
health nurses and psychologists. The suffering and cry for justice is an archetypal experience 
that underlies the fragility and vulnerability of our human existence.  When there is justice, 
there is the possibility for peace and hope.  The Teacher-Student relation signifies a cry for 
justice and a response of compassion. Even though the teacher might never fulfil her or his 
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responsibilities, an ethical response of justice will always remain.  Approaching a student 
with psychosis seems just as demanding as the necessary requirements for a life of 
contemplation.  Levinas’ thought demonstrates a profoundly “prayerful” response to the 
Other as a means to both safeguard and to have a sense of sacredness, dignity and humanity.  
 
CONCLUSION: INVITING THE STRANGER, APPROACHING PSYCHOSIS 
Through behaving “otherwise” by way of prayer and compassion, we might envision “the 
impossible” of establishing justice and peace through responsibility for students suffering the 
moods and difficulties of psychosis. With this in mind and in view of Levinas’ emerging 
analysis of “having a sense”, I would suggest the following threefold ethical and prayerful 
approach: 
 
1. Develop an ethical sense and prayerful stance of compassion, hospitality and 
generosity. 
2. Focus on the student’s subjective existence e.g. feelings, emotions, intentions and 
attitudes. 
3. Risk a dialectical relationship between being subjectively compassionate (the act of 
personhood) and being objectively inquiring (the act of speech) in the hope of 
creating peace, making just judgments and responsible decisions. 
 
The approach here emphasises that teaching in difficult and challenging situations demands a 
response comparable to love and even a spiritual life of contemplation.  Imagining the ethical 
possibility for eros and engaging unknowability, Sharon Todd and Michalinos Zembylas have 
respectively provided some ground and direction to offer some reflections on approaching 
psychosis in teaching and learning. The growing contribution of Education scholars taking up 
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Levinas’ writings brings hope to continuing the tradition of humanism.  Amongst this hope is 
a learning environment that is hospitable, generous, engaging and responsible. Further, we 
might even discover here an inchoate horizon for dialogue between Education scholars, 
philosophers and theologians. 
 
Emmanuel Levinas’ life was dominated by the presentiment and memory of the Shoah.  He 
endeavoured to give meaning to his experience of trauma and horror through his writings.  
His life in itself is a testimony of hope against useless suffering.  His philosophy bears 
witness to inviting the stranger as friend.  We can well regard his writings as demanding 
enough to warrant such an approach.  After all, are not true friends the ones with whom we 
can more easily bear forth love, compassion and sacrifice!  I really do not know the “answer” 
of how to approach people with psychosis, but I can imagine a possibility amongst the 
impossibility of creating a truly heartfelt response to a student with psychosis. The possibility 
begins in developing a sense of how to listen to the Other and how to approach the 
unknowable in him or her.  This leads us towards a world of ambiguities and traces in which 
we find the student’s face (existence) fading, absenting, restricting or resisting itself in 
relationship.  None the less, the more we partake in the depths of humanity and the good, the 
more we have an opportunity to respond generously with determination, perseverance, prayer 
and hope.  
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